





In  almost  all  African  countries,  political  liberation  was  supported  extensively  by  people’s 
movements, faith‐based formations and various constellations of civil society. There was a close 
link  between  civil  society  and  political  society.  From  North  to  South,  West  to  East,  civil 









particular,  non‐governmental  organisations  assumed major  roles  and  became major  forces  in 
development.  
Even  recent  studies  across  the  globe  have  attempted  to  show  that  civil  society,  or  what  is 
generally  referred  to  as  the  third  sector  make  massive  contributions  to  the  Gross  Domestic 
Products of their governments. These studies were conducted as a response to the fact that this 
sector has more often been sidelined by policy‐makers. In the words of renowned scholar Lester 
Salamon  of  The  Johns  Hopkins  University,  ‘social  and  political  discourse  remains  heavily 
dominated by a ‘two‐sector model’ that acknowledges the existence of only two social spheres 
outside of  the  family unit—the market  and  the  state, or business  and government’  (Salamon, 
2003)ii. And for a long time, civil society contributions were kept out of the official statistics. This 
is  still  the  case  in many  countries.  As  a  result  civil  society’s  potential  and  real  contribution  in 
policy debates and formulation has been ignored or at worst challenged.  
However  as  The  Johns  Hopkins  Comparative  Non‐Profit  Sector  Studies  have  shown,  ‘the  third 
sector is a major economic force’. A study of 35 countries in 2003 (16 advanced, 14 developing 
and 5 transitional) showed that the third sector was a $1.3 trillion industry as of the late 1990s—
this  represented  about  5.1%  of  the  combined  GDP  of  the  35  countries.  Further,  the  study 
showed  that  the  sector was  the  seventh world  largest  economy—that  is  if  civil  society was  a 
national economy—it would be the seventh ahead of Italy, Brazil, Russia, Spain and Canada and 
just  behind  the  United  Kingdom  and  France.  The  sector  is  also  a major  employer,  employing 
more than 39.5 million fulltime equivalent workers (Salamon, 2003). 






spheres—be  they  political,  economic,  cultural,  and  social  or  various  combinations.  In  most 
countries as we discuss later, this sector is viewed with suspicion—despite the fact that most of 
these  governments  came  into  power  through  the  support  of  civil  society  formations  or were 
themselves civil society formations before.  
More recently, the space for citizens’ participation in various levels of the body politic has been 
shrunk.  More  and  more,  legal  instruments  have  emerged  to  regulate  how  groups  should 
conduct their activities. The recent attempts to close the space for citizens and their formations 
are  not  particularly  African—it  is  a  global  phenomenon  symptomatic  of  the  growing  backlash 




and  is  an  international  practice—however most  of  these  laws  do  not meet  the  international 
standards and principles that protect citizens’ rights. Ironically, these laws also violate their own 
constitutions—reinforcing  the  view  that  in  the  majority  of  these  countries  there  are 






This paper  is therefore a discussion of the  legislative environment under which civil society,  in 
particular  organized  formations,  operate  in  Africa.  It  is  based  on  twelve  African  countries 
(Angola, DRC, Ethiopia, Liberia, Mauritius, Mozambique, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, South Africa, 
Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe).  In all  these countries we studied civil‐state relations, existing 
NGO  laws  and  NGO  policies,  including  other  laws  that  have  an  impact  on  NGOs,  national 
constitutions,  processes  and  the  general  political  economy  of  the  third  sector.  The  merging 
findings  point  to  some  interesting  conclusions.  More  studies  are  underway  in  Botswana, 
Cameroon,  Ghana,  Kenya,  Lesotho,  Madagascar,  Malawi,  Namibia,  Nigeria,  Senegal,  and 
Swaziland.  The  findings  from  these  will  be  integrated  into  the  current  paper.  This  paper  is 
therefore work in progress—nevertheless the countries studied already are significant to begin a 
discourse on state‐civil society relations, public spaces, and the general legislative environment 
for  citizens  and  their  formations.  One  of  the  emerging  findings  is  that  the  political  context 
determined the emergence of these legal instruments.  









not  enacted  for  NGOs  but  have  a  direct  and  indirect  impact  on  the  very  existence  and 
functionality of civil society organisations.  
The third section discusses the processes followed in enacting these laws—whether the process 
is  consultative  or  state‐driven.  The  section  also  looks  at  authorities  enacted  to  monitor  civil 
society, including reporting and registration authorities.  
Section four discusses the provisions of these laws and what they impact on, particularly general 





The relationship between citizens and  the state as well as  that between organized  formations 
and their governments vary from one country to another. Even in one country, relations are not 
always the same—they change periodically. The context, in most cases politics, determines the 









informal  networks  were  the  bedrock  of  the  struggle  against  colonialism  and  other  forms  of 
exploitation. In South Africa, the struggle against apartheid was not won only through liberation 
movements such as the African National Congress, among others. Mass movements such as the 
United  Democratic  Front  (UDF)  and  other  black  consciousness  groups  helped  to  dismantle 
apartheid. Organized groups like the Black Sash, the Legal Resources Centre, South African Civics 
Organization  (SANCO) and trade unions used different  legal and non‐legal  strategies  to  isolate 
the  regime. They were  therefore  in direct collision with  the stateiv; however  their  relationship 
with  the political‐liberation movements blurred. There  is no doubt however  that some groups 
colluded with  the  apartheid  state.  But  in  the main  groups  fighting  for  political  and  civil  rights 
were  the basis on which national  struggles were waged.  The  same  is  true of  Zimbabwe, DRC, 
and other countries under study.  In Liberia,  for example,  traditional  societies  (susu) and other 
grassroots  formations  have  historically  been  in  existence  throughout  the  country.  As  the 
National NGO Policy (2007)v notes, these and later on the faith based institutions facilitated the 
transformation  and  socio‐development  of  the  country. With  the  advent  of  the  war  in  1989–
2003,  civil  society  organisations,  in  particular  international  organisations,  had  to  step  in  to 
address the humanitarian and socio‐political and economic crisis.  
In the DRC, as is discussed by Ekeh (1972, 1975)vi, there was a creation of two publics as a result 
of  colonization.  One  was  the  primordial  public,  which  was  made  up  of  ethnic  groups  and 
community associations. These were established to meet the welfare needs of those colonized. 
The other was civic public  that bore  the symbols and  institutions of  the post‐colonial  state.  In 
Mauritius, where the relationship between the colonial government and citizens was that of the 
powerful and the powerless, civil  society groups were established to address the needs of  the 
colonized.vii  In  Angola,  civil  society  activity  is  traceable  to  XIX  century  when  indigenous  civic 
groups  as  well  as  cultural  associations  were  launched  to  reaffirm  their  cultural  heritage  and 




struggle  to  free  their  countries. Others  transformed  themselves  into  liberation movements.  In 
this  period,  the  lines were  indeed  blurred  between  political  society  and  civil  society.  Political 
parties  that  later on became ruling parties  soon after  independence had strong  relations with 
civil society.  
These  relations  however  changed  in  most  cases  soon  after  independence  as  a  result  of  the 
movement towards one‐party system. 
Post‐Independence: Closed Spaces, Adversarial Relations 




coup  in  1977,  there was  a movement  by MPLA  to  introduce  a  one‐party  state. With  it  came 
party  created  organisations  and  institutions  such  as  women’s  organisation  (Organizacao  das 
Mulheres  Angolanas),  the  national  youth movement  (Juventude  do MPLA)  and  trade  unions. 
This will have ramifications for the current state of relations between the state and civil society 
formations.  In  Mozambique,  the  same  happened;  the  one‐party  state  created  mass 
organisations, cooperatives and state farms. Organisations close to the ruling party dominated 
the  public  sphere.  These  were  groups  referred  to  as  mass  democratic  movements,  such  as 
women’s organisations, organisation of journalists and national youth associations.ix An AfriMAP 
paper submitted to the APRM Country Review Mission (2009) supported this assertion. It stated: 
Under  the  one‐party  state,  civil  society  participation  was  limited  by  various 
constraints inherent to the political system itself. Spaces for discussion, through 
the  FRELIMO  party  branches  and  committees,  or  the  network  of  People’s 
Assemblies,  were  hierarchically  structured  and  clearly  subordinate  to  the 
political  guidance  of  the  party.  Below  the  official  party  structures  and  the 
People’s  Assemblies,  there  were  the  so‐called  Mass  Democratic 
Organisations…The few autonomous organisations that existed, even when they 
had  objectives  different  from  those  of  the  state  and  the  ruling  party,  were 
subject to their control. The private sector operated in a context of strong state 
intervention, and  there were no adequate mechanisms  for  its  interaction with 
the government which dictated almost unilaterally all the rules of the game.x 
In  the second Republic of DRC  (1965–1990), a coup  in 1965  led  to a de  facto one‐party  state. 
Multi‐party politics was outlawed as a result and so was social activism curtailed. This led to the 
unification  of  the  labour  movements  into  one  union  aligned  to  the  ruling  party.  Cultural 
associations were also outlawed—so was independent media. The single‐party system replaced 
all  forms  of  association,  sounding  a  death  knell  to  civil  society.  Like  in  most  countries,  the 
church,  in particular,  the Roman Catholic Church  remained playing  the  roles of  civil  society  in 
such as areas as education and health.  




One of  the  ironies  of  democratization  and  the  subsequent  stability  it  brings  is  that more  and 









Although  all  the  countries  under  study  embraced  multi‐party  systems  and  held  periodic 
elections, developed constitutions that enshrined civil and political rights for their citizens, and 
formed part of the democratization wave, the plurality of them still maintained their suspicion 




collegial  and  collaborative,  especially  for  service  delivery  groups;  adversarial,  particularly  for 




from  civil  society  joined  the  democratic  state  and  the  private  sector  after  1994.  The 
development challenges of the country such as HIV‐AIDS,  land reform and the general poverty 
levels has meant that at times civil society has had to engage the state in confrontational ways. 
Again  groups  that  have  done  so  such  as  the  Treatment  Action  Campaign  (TAC),  social 
movements  and  other  interest  based  groups  have  had  different  relations  with  the  state—at 
times confrontational but also collegial depending on the context.  It  is  this  fluidity  in relations 
that has contributed towards some form of constitutional democracy in South Africa.  




society  relations.  There was  a move  towards more  consultation  and  cooperative mechanisms 
between  government,  business  and  civil  society.  As  a  result,  civil  society  in Mozambique  has 
‘gradually  increased  its  ability  to  influence  government  planning  and  policies,  while  the 
government has been increasing its channels for interaction with civil society’ (AfriMAP, 2009). 




public  space.  At  least  these  groups  can  use  the  Bicesse  Accord,  which  among  other  things 
recognized the rights of political parties, freedom of assembly and association. 
In Seychelles, although the government has strong control over the media, there is widespread 
acceptance  that  recent  changes  in  government  have  facilitated  a  move  towards  creating 
opportunities for civil society in contributing to the country’s needs. The role of government is 




that  views  civil  society  as  a  partner  in  development—and  the  relationship  is  that  of  mutual 




of  liberalization.  Human  rights  organisations  were  among  the  first  to  emerge  to  address  the 
human rights violations of the state. This led to a breakdown in relations. The state did not want 
to share the public space and the new groups  lacked experience  in engaging the regime. As  in 
most countries, liberalization facilitated the emergence of new political players, some of whom 
came  from  civil  society.  This  led  to  tensions  between  the  state  and  civil  society  groups.  The 
National Sovereign Conference (1991–1992) somewhat politicized civil society—leading to many 
of them playing political roles in DRC’s Mobutu. Under Kabila’s reigns, there was an attempt to 
control  civil  society  by  channeling  financial  and  other  forms  of  aid  through  government, 
harassment  and  arrest  of  activists  and  difficult  registrations  requirements.xiii  These  relations 
however were not static—for example, in 1998, Kabila adopted a more conciliatory approach to 
civil  society. And when  Joseph Kabila  took over,  there was a move by  some  in  civil  society  to 
government. This was partly because Kabila also adopted a conciliatory approach by unbanning 
political parties and encouraging civil  society and other  formations  to  take part  in  formulating 
laws of the country. Hence civil society played key roles in the Inter‐Congolese Dialogue. 
The  political  contexts  in  Zimbabwe,  Uganda  and  Ethiopia  are  worth  noting  in  terms  of  their 
current  relations  with  civil  society.  In  Zimbabwe,  cracks  started  developing  in  the mid‐1990s 




viewed  civil  society,  in  particular  advocacy  and  human  rights  groups  as  an  extension  of  the 
opposition. Just as the government has consistently argued that MDC is a ‘puppet of the West’, 
so have civil  society groups. One of  the weaknesses of civil  society during  this  time was  to be 
synonymous with the opposition. This is the context under which the current relations ought to 
be  understood.  Even  though  Zimbabwe  has  now  formed  a Unity  Government,  those  strained 
relations have not changed.  In Ethiopia,  the strained relations can be  traced back  to  the 2005 
Presidential elections where some activists and members of the opposition and journalists were 
arrested  for  questioning  the  credibility  of  the  elections.  In  Uganda,  although  the  NRM  was 
always sensitive to its security, the advocacy work of some NGOs especially the anti‐corruption 
campaigns  and  the  ‘mabira’  crusade  (a mobilization  of  groups  against  the  state’s  proposal  to 
give  away  a  significant  portion  of  natural  tropical  rain  forest  to  an  investor  for  sugarcane), 
governance  reports  critical  of  the  country,  among others  could have heightened  the  speed at 
which government then controlled the space.  
What these contexts show is that state‐civil society relations are fluid and have been changing 
historically  between  pivotal  moments  in  history  and  between  various  encounters  with  each 
other.  In some  instances  the  relations have moved  from cooperation  to adversity and back  to 
cooperation.  In  others,  the  relations  have  moved  from  supporting  each  other  during  the 
liberation  environment  to  that  of  suspicion  both  under  one‐party  state  and  in  today’s multi‐
party system. The new trend however is for states to revisit old laws with the view of tightening 
them so that it is easy to control associational life. And where none exists, new ones are crafted 




as  discourse  of  the  ‘legal  environment  for  civil  society  in  the  wider  political  and  governance 
context’. The legal operating environment for civil society in these countries is a product of the 
history of colonial struggles, post‐colonial independence and contemporary state formation. It is 
therefore  important to ask, what are the political contexts that shape the  legal  instruments  in 
these  countries? Could  it be  that  there are worrying  trends  in  civil  society  that warrant  these 
laws? Or is the state just concerned about the narrow conception of security? Is this a peculiar 











assembly,  association,  and  expression)  and  rights  such  as  political,  civil  and  economic.  This  is 
despite the nature of the regime. 
In countries that have enabling laws or where relations between civil society and the state are 
cordial  and  of mutual  respect,  the  laws  are  embedded  in  their  constitutions.  In  other words, 
there  is an effort  to align the  letter and spirit of  the constitution with the policies and further 
legislation  on  specifics.  In  South  Africa,  for  example,  the  NPO  Act,  71‐1997  made  a  clear 
distinction between creating an enabling environment for civil society and the other objectives 





In  the  DRC,  in  addition  to  the  Constitution,  the  law  that  regulates  civil  society  is  Law  no 
004/2001 which determines the registration process of groups.  In Mauritius, section 12 of  the 
Constitution guarantees the right to freedom while section 13 guarantees the right to freedom 
of assembly and association. However  laws  specific  to  civil  society  include,  the Civil  Code and 
the Registration of Associations Act, (4/465, 1979), Cooperatives Act, and Companies Act. Other 
laws that have an impact on civil society include Industrial relations Act, Income Tax Act, Public 





also  affected  by  Regulatory  Decree  law  no  84/02  that  regulates  activities  of  NGOs,  their 
registration,  accountability  and  taxation  among other  things. And  in Mozambique,  the  Law of 
Association, no 8/91 regulates registration and taxation among other things. In addition, Decree 
Law  no  55/98  regulates  and  defines  the  legal  operation  framework  for  international 
organisations.  Other  laws  cited  earlier  such  as  those  pertaining  to  the  press  and  media  also 
impact on civil society operations.  
In  Uganda,  the  NGO  Act  (2006)  is  the  main  law  regulating  civil  society.  However,  the  NGO 
Regulations  (2008)  and  the  NGO  Policy  (2009)  are  other  frameworks  that  impact  on  the 
operations of civil society. In Zimbabwe, the NGO Bill of 2004, which was not passed, was meant 
to be the principal law that would regulate the activities of civil society. However, various parts 
of  that  Bill  have  resurfaced  in  various  pieces  of  legislation—for  example,  on  Constitutional 
Amendment no. 18 and the Electoral Act. Laws such as Access to Information and Protection of 
Privacy Act (AIPA) and the Public Order Security among others also had impacts on civil society. 
In  Zimbabwe,  the  minister  responsible  for  NGOs  once  issued  a  memo/letter  that  closed  the 
operations  of  civil  society.  This  shows  that  at  times  regimes may  not  need  to  enact  a  law  to 





often  legitimized  these  actions  by  couching  them  in  counter‐terrorism  measures,  protecting 
national security, curbing NGO abuse and ensuring that NGOs are accountable and transparent. 
In  some  instances,  for  example,  Liberia  and Sierra  Leone,  states have argued  that NGO Policy 
Frameworks  are meant  to  align  NGO work  with  country  priorities.  And  yet  in  some  extreme 
cases, states have argued that civil society groups represent foreign interests and pose a risk to 
national security.  In an  interview with  the BBC’s Zeinab Badawi on HardTalk, on April 2, 2009, 
Prime  Minister  Meles  Zenawi  responded  to  a  question  that  the  NGO  Law  undermined  the 
independence of civil society by saying: 
‘It  does  not  undermine  the  independence  of  Ethiopian  civil  society 
organisations. What it undermines is the funding of civil society organisations in 
Ethiopia  who  are  involved  in  political  activities  from  foreign  sources.  And  I 
believe  the  practice  in  all  developed  countries  is  that  political  activities  are 
funded from local sources.’xiv 
He went on to say that only those NGOs involved in political activities will be affected. He said, 
‘all  those  NGOs  who  are  involved  in  economic,  social  and  environmental  developmental 





stable  and  enabling  environments,  the  approach  in  crafting  these  laws  was  consultative,  for 
example  in  countries  such  as  South  Africa.  However  in  countries  that  are  concerned  about 
security threats to their political power base, the approach was state‐driven. Also interesting in 
these selected countries  is  the responsible authorities  for registration, monitoring and general 
operations  of  civil  society.  In most  of  these  countries,  a  board  or  state  agency manages  the 
affairs of civil society. Who is appointed and who appoints them is an interesting area of enquiry.  
In  Uganda,  the  process  was  state‐driven  even  though  on  a  number  of  occasions  civil  society 
groups tried to influence the end product. Larok has documented the response by NGOs as soon 
as the government decided to amend the 1989 NGO Statute. He says: 
‘There  was  a  spontaneous  rise  of  NGO  action  and  campaign  in  opposition  to 
most aspects of  the bill.  Several memos,  lobby  letters and meetings  sought  to 
improve  the  proposed  bill  to  create  a  more  enabling  environment  for  NGOs. 
…despite  all  the  above  valid  concerns  and  the  spirited  effort  by  NGOs  to 
influence the proposed legislation for the better, including the development, by 






for NGOs  in 2007  literally wrote a  letter  that stopped the activities of NGOs  in  the country.  In 
Ethiopia,  the state drafted the  law and presented  it  for comments. A number of groups made 
submissions and even requested meetings with the Prime Minister. He met them at least twice 
to  take their concerns but still maintained that  the  law did not violate anyone’s constitutional 
rights.xv  The  Zambian  bill  was  also  drafted  by  government  and  CSOs  made  submissions.  In 
Angola, the laws were driven by the state; there is no evidence that civil society was consulted. 
The same seems to have happened in Mozambique.  
In  other  countries,  however  the  process was  consultative.  This was  the  case  in  Liberia,  Sierra 
Leone and South Africa. In the South African case, the formulation of the law was a lengthy and 
rigorous  exercise.  It  involved  consultations  between  government,  civil  society  and  other 
development partners. A number of NGOs played leading roles in the formulation of the law, for 





Where  the  relations  between  the  state  and  civil  society  are  somewhat  cordial,  the  process 
leading  to  the  formulation  of  the  laws  seems  to  have  been  consultative.  The  consultation 
continues in many forms. The legal environment in those countries is also enabling. However in 
countries  where  the  relations  are  adversarial,  the  process  was  state‐driven  and  civil  society 
groups  tried  frantically  to  influence  the  process  to  very minimal  success.  The  environment  in 
those countries is not enabling and tensions still persist. 
Except  for  a  few  cases,  it  is  also  interesting  to  draw  a  link  between  the  type  of  approach 
(consultative  or  state‐driven),  the  type  of  existing  environment  and  the  relations,  and  the 
ministry responsible for the registration and general oversight of NGOs.  
In  environments  that  are  somewhat  enabling  and  where  the  process  was  consultative,  the 
relevant ministry is either one responsible for social development like South Africa, (Angola is an 
exception  here  because  the  relevant  ministry  is  that  of  social  assistance  and  reintegration), 
ministry  of  finance  and  economic  affairs  (Liberia)  and ministry  of  development  and  economic 
development (Sierra Leone). The Registrar of Associations is responsible for NGOs in Mauritius.  
Zimbabwe  is  exceptional  in  this  case  because  it  regulates  NGOs  under  the ministry  of  public 
service,  labour  and  social  welfare  despite  the  fact  that  its  process  was  not  consultative—its 
relations with civil society are strained and the environment is restrictive. 




for  NGOs  and  a  state‐dominated  agency  supervises  the  work  of  NGOs.  In  DRC  too,  it  is  the 
ministry  of  justice  that  is  responsible  for  NGOs.  In Mozambique,  it  is  the ministry  of  foreign 







It  is  this  vibrancy  and  the  need  to  hold  governments  accountable  that  most  civil  society 
organisations  have  been  targeted  by  restrictive  laws  and  hostile  political  environments.  The 
response  to  these  groups  varies  from  country  to  country  depending  on  the  political 
environment. In somewhat enabling environments like South Africa, civil society is viewed as a 





arrests,  imprisonment,  and  at  times  torture  for  those  involved  (Larok,  2009).  The  World 
Movement  for  Democracy  has  outlined  in  their  global  report  on Defending  Civil  Society,  the 
various methods used to restrict civil liberties. They remark that ‘in less than a year, more than 
twenty  countries  globally  have  introduced  restrictive  legislation  and  regulations  aimed  at 
undermining civil society and diminishing the space in which they operate’. They further observe 
that the ‘ongoing backlash against democracy has been characterized by a pronounced shift from 
outright  repression of democracy, human  rights  and  civil  society  activists  and groups  to more 
subtle government efforts to restrict the space in which civil society especially democracy oriented 











or  rather  it  is  silent  on  governance matters,  policy  and  human  rights  issues—most  of 
which  define  the  political  landscape  in  Africa.  The  danger  is  that  as  long  as  the  state 
enacts a law based on this narrow definition, it can and when it deems necessary invoke 
this  law  to  curtail  the  activities  of  those  groups  that  operate  in  the  democracy, 
governance and human rights fields. 
b) Cumbersome  Registration:  the  registration  process  in  most  of  these  countries  is 
stringent and cumbersome.  It  is also bureaucratic. More often registration takes more 
than 6 months, for example in Uganda. 
c) State‐Centric Board:  In most of  these  countries  the  state has put  in place a governing 
Board  which  is  dominated  by  government  officials.  In  Uganda  for  example,  the  NGO 
Registration  Board  does  not  provide  for  representation  by  NGOs.  Rather  it  has 
representation  from  state  security  operatives  (internal  security  organization  and 
















f) Barrier  to Right  to  Fundraise: Most of  these  laws have  restrictions on  fundraising.  For 
example,  the Ethiopian Proclamation  requires  that  local NGOs working on governance 
and  political  areas mobilize  not more  than  10%  of  their  resources  from  international 





What  this paper has sought  to show  is  that  the  legal operational environment  for civil  society 
should be  located within  the broader  governance  and  various  epochs of  state  formation.  The 
character  of  the  state  and  its  record  in  governance  determines  the  nature  of  relations  it 
establishes with  those  that  seek  to monitor  its  activities.  Secondly,  this paper has  shown  that 
the resurgence of restrictions on citizens’ participation in public spheres and in the body politic 
is  a  global  phenomenon.  It  is  a  backlash  on  democracy  and  not  necessarily  an  attack  on  civil 
society; civil society happens to be collateral damage. However where there are good governance 
principles and institutions and democracy is thriving, the legal environment is enabling.  
A  question  that  needs  to  be  pursued  in  successive  research  activities  is whether  the  greatest 
threat to civil society’s operating space is the regulatory environment or civil society itself. Has 
funding  of  civil  society  opened  the  space  or  curtailed  it?  And  what  are  civil  society  groups 
protecting  by  protesting  these  laws?  What  is  the  value  of  civil  society  groups  in  different 
countries? And do groups need to be registered to work on behalf of citizens? 
Is  it not given that  freedom of association and assembly will always be contested especially  in 
politically unstable contexts? 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